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Abstract 
Using data from Mexico, this paper studies empirically the link between trade policy 
and individual income risk and the extent to which this varies across workers of 
different human capital (education) levels. Longitudinal income data on workers are 
used to estimate time-varying individual income risk parameters in different 
manufacturing sectors in Mexico between 1987 and 1998, a period in which the 
Mexican economy experienced substantial changes in trade policy. In a second step, 
the variations in trade policy − across different sectors and over time − are used to 
estimate the linkage between trade policy and income risk for workers of varying 
education levels. Our findings are as follows. The level of openness of an economy is 
not found to be related to income risk for workers of any type. Furthermore, changes 
in trade policy (i.e., trade policy reforms) are not found to have any effect on the risk 
to income faced by workers with either low or high levels of human capital. However, 
workers with intermediate levels of human capital are found to experience a 
statistically and economically significant increase in income risk immediately 
following liberalization of trade. Our findings thus point to an interesting non-
monotonicity in the interaction between human capital, income risk and trade policy 
changes.  
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I. Introduction  
 
In recent years, the impact of the increased “openness” of countries on factor markets 
has been actively debated in the theoretical and empirical literature in international 
trade.
2 This literature has focused primarily on how greater openness to trade might 
differentially impact the level of the returns earned by different factors of production. 
More specifically, guided by the logic of the well-known Stolper-Samuelson theorem, 
which predicts an increase in returns to abundant factors with trade, analysts have 
sought to examine how trade may have impacted workers of different levels of human 
capital (education) − looking, for example, to see whether wage inequality between 
skilled and unskilled workers has increased in countries with a relative abundance of 
skilled workers (developed countries) in the manner predicted by the theory.
3  
 
Recently, however, the literature has also begun discussing the important question of 
how openness may impact income volatility at the aggregate (see, for instance, Rodrik 
(1997)) as well as at the individual level (see Krebs, Krishna and Maloney (2005)). 
Various channels through which trade reform might affect individual income risk 
have been articulated. For example, lowering trade barriers leads to an increase in 
foreign competition in the import-competing sectors and is likely to induce a 
reallocation of capital and labor across firms and sectors. In the short run, the 
resulting turbulence may raise individual labor income risk.
4 Rodrik (1997), going 
beyond the short-term re-allocational effects of trade reform on income risk, has 
additionally argued that increased foreign competition following trade reform will 
increase the elasticity of the goods and the derived labor demand functions. If higher 
demand elasticity translates any given shock into larger variations in wages and 
employment, lower trade barriers may lead to increased individual income risk.
5 On 
the other hand, it has also been suggested that the world economy is likely to be less 
                                                 
2For a general discussion of the debate, see for instance, Bhagwati (2001) and Rodrik (1997). 
3Early papers in this area include Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) and Borjas, Freeman and Katz 
(1992). See Richardson (1995) for a survey discussion. 
4See, for instance, the analysis of policy change by Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), in which ex-ante 
identical workers experience ex-post different outcomes since some workers retain their jobs while 
others are forced to move to other firms. 
5While Rodrik (1997) appears to have in mind mostly aggregate volatility, it can be seen that with 
heterogeneous impact of such a change on firms (and thus individuals) in the economy, individual 
income volatility will be raised as well. See, for instance, the analysis of Melitz (2003) for an example 
of an aggregate policy shock affecting an entire sector leading to heterogeneous outcomes for   2
volatile than the economy of any single country, which leads to goods prices that are 
more stable worldwide than in any single autarkic economy. This opens up the 
possibility that greater openness may reduce the variance in individual incomes. Thus, 
overall, the relationship between openness and individual income risk is theoretically 
ambiguous, requiring empirical analysis for its resolution. In a recent paper, Krebs, 
Krishna and Maloney (2005), we have investigated this trade-income risk question 
empirically and have reported economically significant impacts of trade policy 
(changes) on the volatility of worker incomes.
6 
 
The possibility that trade policy may affect income risk in labor markets raises 
additional questions. Is the effect uniform across workers? Or, for instance, are 
workers with higher human capital better able to insulate themselves against trade 
policy changes? Evaluating empirically the interaction between human capital, trade 
policy and income risk is important for a number of reasons. First, this helps us 
evaluate the merits of particular theoretical arguments that assume differential effects 
of openness on variables such as labor turnover for workers of different human capital 
levels. For instance, the well-known argument by Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994) 
regarding “kaleidoscopic comparative advantage” argues that the observed trend of 
increased inequality in wages between workers of high and low levels of education 
may be explained by the differences in the way that openness impacts labor turnover 
rates (a component of income risk) for these two groups. Second, from a public policy 
perspective, it is important to know how policy changes impact different segments of 
the population; public opposition to “globalization” is driven at least in part by 
concerns that openness affects most adversely the poorest workers. Finally, such an 
analysis will deepen our understanding of the trends in the supply of human capital in 
the labor market.  
 
In this paper, we study empirically the effects of trade policy on individual income 
risk for workers of different levels of human capital using the following approach. For 
each industry (sector), we use longitudinal data on individual earnings for different 
types of workers to estimate time-varying parameters of individual income risk using 
                                                                                                                                            
individual firms within that sector. 
6 In this paper, we draw substantially on this earlier paper by us, specifically in presenting  the main 
issues and in describing the methodological approach  (Sections I-III).   3
an approach similar to Carroll and Samwick (1997), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), and 
Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004). More specifically, we focus on the variance 
of (unpredictable) changes of individual income as a measure of income risk, and 
carefully distinguish between transitory and persistent income shocks. The distinction 
between transitory and persistent income shock is important since workers can 
effectively self-insure against transitory shocks through own savings, which implies 
that the effect of these types of shocks on workers’ consumption and welfare are quite 
small (Aiyagari (1994) Heaton and Lucas (1996), Levine and Zame (2002)). In 
contrast, highly persistent or permanent income shocks have a substantial effect on 
the present value of future earnings, and therefore lead to significant changes in 
consumption even if workers have own savings. Thus, from a welfare point of view, 
persistent income shocks matter the most, and we therefore focus on the relationship 
between trade policy and the persistent component of income risk. More specifically, 
after obtaining the estimates of the persistent component of income risk for each 
industry and each year, we use these estimates in conjunction with tariff data (as a 
proxy for trade policy) to study empirically the effect of trade policy on income risk.  
 
Our previous discussion highlights the need for longitudinal information on incomes 
at a disaggregated level (individual or household)
7 in countries that have undergone 
discernable (and, ideally substantial) changes in their external regime. Unfortunately, 
countries that maintain detailed longitudinal records on individual incomes have 
rarely undertaken major trade reforms and countries that have undertaken extensive 
trade policy reforms have rarely collected data on individuals of requisite scope and 
quality. In this paper, however, we focus on one country that satisfies both criteria, 
namely Mexico. As is well known, the Mexican economy experienced substantial 
changes in trade policy in the late 1980s and in the later half of the 1990s.
8 Moreover, 
as we discuss in detail later in this paper, the Mexican government, since the mid-
1980’s, has conducted quarterly longitudinal income surveys that comprehensively 
surveyed workers in all manufacturing sectors of the economy − providing the unique 
data source that we use in our study. 
                                                 
7It should be clear that our need for longitudinal data follows from our desire to study how trade policy 
impacts the magnitude and frequency of individual income shocks (changes). This is a quite distinct 
task from that of measuring the impact of trade policy on the distribution of income levels. 
8In an early wave of trade reforms in the late 1980s, tariffs were cut from an average of about 40 
percent to about 15 percent.   4
 
Our empirical results for the Mexican case can be summarized as follows. The level 
of openness of an economy is not found to be related to income risk for workers of 
any type. Furthermore, changes in trade policy (i.e., trade policy reforms) are not 
found to have any affect on the risk to income faced by workers with either low or 
high levels of human capital. However, workers with intermediate levels of human 
capital are found to experience a statistically and economically significant increase in 
income risk immediately following liberalization of trade. Our findings thus point to 
an interesting non-monotonicity in the interaction between human capital, income risk 
and trade policy changes. Finally, the welfare costs of the increased income risk 
following trade policy reforms are substantial − amounting to reduction of between 
one and two percent of permanent income.
9 
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the estimation 
procedure and data that we use to estimate individual income risk. Section III 
discusses the empirical methodology we use in a second stage to find estimates of the 
relationship between income risk and trade policy. Section IV describes the 
theoretical framework that will be used to translate changes in income risk into 
changes in welfare. Section V presents our results. Section VI concludes.  
 
II. Income Risk  
 
The first stage of our analysis concerns the estimation of individual income risk. Our 
estimation strategy follows earlier approaches taken in the literature estimating US 
labor income risk (Carroll and Samwick (1997) Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) and 
Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004)) with some important differences which we 
discuss in detail below. As in these papers, we define income risk as the variance of 
(unpredictable) changes in individual income, and carefully distinguish between 
transitory and persistent income shocks. This separation is essential from a welfare 
point of view since self-insurance through saving works well for transitory income 
                                                 
9At this stage, it is worth pointing out that our welfare analysis focuses exclusively on the link between 
trade policy and individual income risk, and that other possible channels through which trade policy 
may affect the economy are not studied here. More specifically, we would expect trade reform to have 
positive effects on the efficiency of resource allocation and economic growth, and these effects are 
important factors that should be taken into account when evaluating the total costs and benefits of trade   5
shocks, but not for persistent ones (Aiyagari (1994), Heaton and Lucas (1996), and 
Levine and Zame (2002)). For this and other reasons (to be discussed in detail below), 
we eventually focus on persistent shocks and their relation to trade policy.  
 
II.1. Data  
 
In Mexico, the National Urban Employment Survey (ENEU) conducts extensive 
quarterly household interviews in the 16 major metropolitan areas and is available 
from the mid-1980s (we use data from 1987-1998 in our study). The sample is 
selected to be geographically and socio-economically representative. The survey 
questionnaire is extensive in scope and covers all standard elements such as 
participation in the labor market, earnings etc. The ENEU is structured so as to track a 
fifth of each sample across a five quarter period. To construct the panels, workers 
were matched by position in an identified household, level of education, age and sex 
to ensure against generating spurious transitions. Taken together, we have 44 
complete panels of 5 periods (i.e., quarters) each, spanning a total of 12 years (48 
quarters). The number of individuals surveyed in any given calendar year is 
approximately 100,000. Table I presents a summary description of the workers 
surveyed by the ENEU. Data on sectoral (i.e., industry) trade barriers and other 
sectoral and macroeconomic variables were obtained from the World Bank.  
 
II.2. Specification  
 
Our survey data provide us with earnings (wage rate times number of hours worked) 
of individuals. As in previous empirical work, we assume that the log of this labor 
income of individual i employed in industry  j  in period t,  ijt log y , is given by:  
  ijt jt t ijt ijt log y x u α β = +⋅+ .  (1) 
 
In (1)  jt α  and  t β  denote time-varying coefficients,  ijt x  is a vector of observable 
characteristics (such as age and education), and  it u  is the stochastic component of 
earnings. The stochastic component  ijt u  represents individual income changes that are 
                                                                                                                                            
reform.    6
not due to changes in the return to observable worker characteristics. For example, 
income changes that are caused by an increase in the skill (education) premium are 
not contained in  ijt u  In this sense, ijt u  measures the unpredictable part of changes in 
individual income. Notice that we allow the fixed effects  jt α  to vary across sectors, 
but that the coefficient  t β  is restricted to be equal across sectors. The latter 
assumption is made in order to ensure that the number of observations is large 
compared to the number of parameters to be estimated.  
 
We assume that the stochastic term is the sum of two (unobserved) components, a 
permanent component  ijt ω  and a transitory component  ijt η :  
  ijt ijt ijt u ω η = +.  (2) 
Permanent shocks to income are fully persistent in the sense that the permanent 
component follows a random walk:  
  11 ij t ijt ij t ω ωε ,+ ,+ = +,  (3) 
where the innovation terms, {} ijt ε , are independently distributed over time and 
identically distributed across individuals. Notice that we allow the parameters to 
depend on time t and industry  j , but not on individual i. We further assume that 
) , 0 ( ~
2
1 1 + + jt ijt N ε σ ε . Transitory shocks have no persistence, that is, the random 
variables  ijt η  are independently distributed over time. Clearly,  ijt η  captures both 
temporary income shocks and measurement error. We assume that they are normally 
distributed with zero mean and a variance that is independent of i, but may depend on 
time or industry:  ) , 0 ( ~
2
jt ijt N η σ η .  
 
Our specification for the labor income process is in accordance with the empirical 
work on US labor income risk. For most part, however, the previous literature has 
confined attention to the special case of time-independent variances (homoscedastic 
case). As we discuss in II.3, the introduction of time-variation in the parameters 
2
jt ε σ  
and 
2
jt η σ  makes the estimation of these parameters more challenging.  Finally, we 
should note that, in principle, both 
2
jt ε σ  and 
2
jt η σ  represent measures of individual 
income risk. In this paper, we will focus on  jt ε σ  and its relationship to trade policy.   7
This choice is motivated by the following two considerations. First, as mentioned 
before, transitory income shocks are unlikely to generate consumption volatility since 
self-insurance through own-saving is highly effective, and the welfare effects of these 
shocks are therefore small (Aiyagari (1994) Heaton and Lucas (1996) and Levine and 
Zame (2002)). Second, the term 
2
jt η σ  will absorb the measurement error in income, 
and therefore overstate the degree of transitory income risk (and this is indeed 
reflected in our data, as we discuss in Section V).  
 
II.3. Estimation  
 
Consider the change in the residual of income of individual i between period t 
andtn + :  
  n ijt ij t n ijt uu u ,+ Δ =−  (4) 
  1 ij t ij t n ij t n ijt … ε εηη ,+ ,+ ,+ = ++ + − .  
 
 
Thus, we have the following expression for the variance of income changes:  
 
22 2 2
1 [] n i j t jt jt n j t jt n var u … εε η η σσ σ σ ,+ ,+ ,+ Δ =+ + +.  (5) 
 
We use the moment restrictions (5) to estimate the parameters 
2
jt ε σ  and 
2
jt η σ  using 
GMM,
10 where the sample analogs to the moment conditions are formed by using the 
estimates of  ijt u  obtained as residuals from regressions of labor income on observable 
characteristics as specified in (1) − an approach also used by Meghir and Pistaferri 
(2004), Storesletten et al. (2004) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002). Specifically, the 





1 [] n i j t jt jt n j t jt n
tn
var u … εε η η σσ σ σ
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ,+ ,+ ,+ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
,
Δ− + ++ ∑  (6) 
 
                                                 
10More specifically, we follow the bulk of the literature and use the equally weighted minimum 
distance (EWMD) estimator. Altonji and Segal (1996) suggests that the EWMD estimator (identity 
weighting matrix) is superior to the two-stage GMM estimator (optimal weighting matrix) once small-
sample bias is taken into account.   8
The first order conditions corresponding to the parameters 
2
jt ε σ ,  and 
2
jt η σ ,  are given 
by:  




















Notice that in general there are many more moment conditions (5) than there are 
parameters to be estimated. More precisely, for each time period t and each industry 
j , there are two parameters (
2
jt ε σ  and 
2
jt η σ ), but n moment conditions given by (5).  
 
Notice also that the objective function (6) is quadratic, which implies that the first-
order conditions associated with the corresponding minimum-distance problem are 
linear in 
2
jt ε σ  and 
2
jt η σ – a feature that facilitates the estimation substantially. 
Specifically, the first order conditions can be organized into a linear equation system  
 
  σ ⋅ = AB  (8) 
 
where 
22 2 2 2 2  
22 () tT t T εε ε η ε η εσ σσσσσ
′
,, , , , , = .... ... , .. ..  is a 2(T-1)-dimensional vector of income 
parameters (T  being the total number of time periods). Estimates of these income 
parameters can then easily be obtained through matrix inversion: 
1 σ
− = . AB   
 
Some intuition for the way in which our approach separates transitory from permanent 
income shocks can be obtained from the following simple example. Suppose that risk 
is time-invariant, 
22
jt j ε ε σ σ =  and 
22
jt j η η σ σ = , an assumption that has been made by 
most of the previous empirical literature on income risk. In this case, the moment 
restrictions (5) become the following:  
 
 
22 [] 2 n ijt j j var u n ηε σ σ Δ= +  (9) 
   9
Thus, the variance of observed n-period income changes is a linear function of n, 
where the slope coefficient is equal to 
2
j ε σ . The insight that the random walk 
component in income implies a linearly increasing income dispersion over time is the 
basis of the estimation method used by several authors. For example, Carroll and 
Samwick (1997) estimate 
2
ε σ  by performing OLS regressions of the left-hand-side of 
(9) on n. While the preceding example, with time-invariant parameters, serves to 
illustrate the intuition underlying the estimation procedure, it should be clear that our 
exercise is more general in the sense that it allows for arbitrary time-variation in the 
income risk parameters. 
 
II.4. Estimation using ENEU data  
 
The preceding section provided a detailed description of a general econometric 
methodology that may be used to estimate time-variant income risk parameters given 
longitudinal data on individual incomes. We note here some additional issues that 
arise in applying this methodology to our data, with particular emphasis on the type of 
income risk accounted for by our estimation procedure.  
 
In forming the sample analogs to the moment conditions (5), we can only use 
information on individuals who are present in a given manufacturing industry in both 
time periods t and tn + . In doing so, we pick up shocks to workers who retain their 
jobs but experience income changes due to changes in their wage rates or the number 
of hours worked. Moreover, we also account for changes in income experienced by 
displaced workers who are re-employed in the same industry. In contrast, displaced 
workers who are reallocated to a different manufacturing industry are not taken into 
account.
11 However, the exclusion of such workers should not be expected to cause 
too great an under-estimation of our income risk parameters as the fraction of 
displaced manufacturing workers who make transition from one manufacturing sector 
to another is very small. In our data, on average less than 10 percent of displaced 
                                                 
11This allows us to circumvent the extremely difficult problem of assigning industries (and thus trade 
policy) to individuals who transit to different industries. Including individuals who make transitions to 
the service (non-tradables) sector by using the procedure of counting them as belonging to the 
manufacturing sector in which they are first observed does not result in any qualitative difference in 
our reported results.   10
workers undergo such a transition. This is consistent with observations from the 
United States that most job creation and destruction takes place within industries. 
 
It is worth noting that there are very few labor force participants in our survey who do 
no work and receive zero wages in any given quarter, which is mainly a consequence 
of the lack of any government-provided unemployment insurance in Mexico and the 
very active informal labor market. More importantly, the proportion of workers who 
are unemployed for longer than the five quarter-periods is extremely small (implying 
that forming the moment conditions as we do above does not cause problems in the 
consistent estimation of persistent income shocks faced by workers). 
 
Finally, we should mention that the variability in income experienced by workers in 
our data set derives from differential changes in the number of hours worked and also 
from both upward and downward changes in their real wages. Thus, despite the often 
cited downward rigidity of wages, our sample includes large numbers of workers 
whose real wages declined. Specifically, Mexico experienced very high inflation rates 
during our sample period with annual declines in aggregate real wage as high as 25 
percent during this time (see, for instance, Hanson (2003)), implying that the wage 
rates of some individual workers declined by an even larger amount.  
 
III. Trade Reform and Income Risk  
 
The procedure outlined in the previous section provides us with estimates of 
individual income risk, 
2
jt ε σ , for each industry (i. e., manufacturing sector)  j  and 
time period, i.e., quarter, t. These time-varying, industry-specific estimates in 
conjunction with observations on trade policy,  jt τ , allow us to estimate the 
relationship between income risk, 
2
jt ε σ , and openness,  jt τ . Consider the following 




01 2 jt j t jt jt jt ετ δ σ αα α α τ ατν = +++ + Δ +.  (10) 
 
In (10) the coefficients  1j α  capture the industry fixed-effects, the  2t α ’s pick up   11
aggregate trends, the coefficient  τ α  measures the effect of openness on income risk 
and  δ α  captures the effects of changes(in the preceding year, say) in trade policy, 
jt τ Δ . The inclusion of industry dummies in the specification above allows us to 
control for any fixed industry-specific factors that may affect the level of riskiness of 
income in that industry. Moreover, the inclusion of time dummies controls for any 
changes in macroeconomic conditions that affect the level of income risk. While this 
ensures that our estimation results are not driven by changes in macroeconomic 
conditions (business cycle effects and/or long-run structural changes) unrelated to 
trade policy, it also means that identification of the relationship between 
2
jt ε σ  and  jt τ  
will have to be based on the differential rate of change in trade barriers across sectors 
over time (or the vector of observations on tariffs in the panel corresponding to (10) 
will be perfectly collinear with the time-dummy vector). This, however, does not pose 
problems for our estimation since trade barriers in Mexico and their changes over 
time do in fact do exhibit substantial cross-sectional variation.
12 
 
Several econometric issues arise in the estimation of equations (10) above. One 
concern is that the left hand side variable, income risk, is estimated and not observed. 
This is not a substantial problem by itself as it is well known that while “measurement 
error” in the dependent variable does reduce precision, it does not bias our estimates. 
A concern arises, however, from the fact that the estimates of 
2
jt ε σ  have different 
standard errors across industries, that is, the specification we have described above 
suffers from a heteroscedasticity problem. Further, since the industries all belong to 
the same macroeconomic environment, there is a possibility of contemporaneous 
correlation in their σ ’s even after controlling for observable macroeconomic factors 
as in (10’), i.e.,  () 0 jt j t Cov ν ν ′ ≠ . Finally, serial correlation in income volatility within 
an industry is a possibility, i.e.,  () 0 jt jt Cov ν ν ′ ≠ . Given the possible presence of 
heteroscedasticity, spatial correlation and serial dependence, consistent estimates of 
the standard errors associated with the coefficient estimates in (10) above are obtained 
by using robust estimation techniques.  
                                                 
12For instance, in Mexico, tariffs varied between 80 and 20 percent prior to the trade reforms of 1987 
and ranged between 20 and 10 percent by 1994 - implying a variation in tariff changes across sectors 
that is quite substantial.   12
 
IV. Income Risk and Welfare  
 
The preceding discussion has outlined our approach to estimating the relationship 
between trade policy and income risk. We now turn to the analysis of the link between 
income risk and welfare, which is provided by a simple dynamic model with 
incomplete markets along the lines of Constantinides and Duffie (1996) and Krebs 
(2004). The model extends the basic insights of the large literature on the permanent 
income hypothesis to a general-equilibrium setting with iso-elastic preferences and 
incomplete markets. It remains tractable enough to permit closed-form solutions for 
equilibrium consumption and welfare which are simple and transparent. Clearly, our 
goal here is not to provide a complete assessment of the effects of income risk on 
welfare taking into account all possible channels, but rather to articulate a simple 
framework that allows us to obtain indicative estimates of welfare change through the 
income risk channel. The model structure and assumptions underlying our approach 
and the limitations of our methodology are discussed below in detail.  
 
The model features long-lived households (workers) that make consumption/saving 
choices in the face of uninsurable income shocks. These income shocks are 
permanent, which implies that self-insurance is an ineffective means to smooth out 
income fluctuations. In other words, the effect of permanent income shocks on 
consumption is substantial. In accordance with Constantinides and Duffie (1996) and 
Krebs (2004), we consider an exchange economy and do not model the labor-leisure 
choice. In this section, we briefly discuss the basic assumptions of the model and state 
the main welfare results.  
 
 
IV.1. Model  
 
Time is discrete and open ended. Income of household i employed in industry  j  in 
period t is denoted by  ijt y . Income is random and defined by an initial level  0 ij y %  and 
the law of motion  
  11 1 (1 )(1 ) jt i jt ij t it yy μ θ ,+ ,+ ,+ = ++ , %%  (11)   13
where  1 jt μ ,+ is a mean growth-rate effect common across workers in the sector and 
1 ij t θ ,+ is an individual-specific shock to the growth rate of income. We assume that 
1 (1 ) ij t log θ ,+ +  is normally distributed with time- and industry-dependent variance 
2
jt σ .  
 
Although the distribution of individual-specific shocks may change over time, the 
shocks are unpredictable in the sense that current and future shocks are uncorrelated. 
To ensure that workers are ex-ante identical, we also assume that the distribution of 
shocks is identical across workers. Each household begins life with no initial financial 
wealth. Households have the opportunity to save, but not borrow, at the common risk-
free rate  t r . Hence, the sequential budget constraint of worker i reads  
 
  1 (1 ) ij t t ijt ijt ijt ar a y c ,+ = ++ −  (12) 
  0 00 ijt ij aa ≥, = .  
 
Here  ijt c  denotes consumption of household i in period t and  ijt a  his asset holdings 
at the beginning of period t (excluding interest payment in this period). Notice that by 
assuming the non-negativity of  ijt a , we have automatically ruled out Ponzi schemes.  












= . ⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦ ∑  (13) 







− =, ≠ , or  () uc l o gc = , that is, preferences exhibit constant degree of 
relative risk aversion γ .  
 
IV.2. Welfare  
 
We can derive an explicit formula for equilibrium welfare that depends on the 
preference parameters β  and γ  and the income parameters  jt μ  and 
2
jt σ , where 
2
jt σ  is 
the variance of the log-normally distributed income shocks η . We also show that the   14
variance 
2
jt σ  of the income process (11) can be identified with the variance 
2
jt ε σ  of the 
permanent component of our empirical specification (1). This provides a tight link 
between the empirical results obtained in section II and the welfare analysis 
conducted in this section. We now briefly outline and discuss the main welfare 
results.  
 
For simplicity, assume that the income parameters are time-independent:  jt j μ μ =  and 
22
jt j ε ε σ σ = . Suppose now that trade reform changes the tariff rate in a particular 
industry  j  from τ  to (1 ) aτ τ +  permanently. Suppose also that the change in the tariff 
rate leads to a corresponding permanent change in income risk from 
2
ε σ  to 
2 (1 ) σ ε σ +Δ . Clearly, this change in income risk induced by trade reform corresponds 
to the long-run effect that is associated with the level term,  jt τ , on the right-hand-side 
of our regression equation (10). We can find the welfare effect of the change in risk, 
σ Δ , by calculating the compensating variation in lifetime consumption,  c Δ . That is, 
we can ask by how much we have to change consumption in each period and state of 
the world to compensate the household for the change in income risk. We can show 
that this compensating differential, expressed as percent of lifetime consumption, is 






1( 1) 5 ( 1) ( 1) ( 1 )
11
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Equation (14) shows how to translate long-run changes in labor income risk, σ Δ , into 
equivalent changes in lifetime consumption,  c Δ . It provides the answer to the 
following question: how much lifetime consumption are risk averse workers willing 
to give up in return for not having to experience the increase in income risk that is 
caused by a change in trade policy. Notice that (14) is the result of an ex-ante welfare 
calculation under rational expectations. More specifically, (14) assumes that workers   15
do not know who will lose and who will gain from trade reform, but they know to 
what extent trade reform creates winners and losers (the effect of trade reform on the 
income risk parameters is known ex-ante).  
 
The welfare expression (14) assumes that the change in 
2
ε σ  is permanent. However, 
we are also interested in the welfare effect of an increase in income risk from 
2
ε σ  to 






































where we introduced the following notation:  
 
x =  ( )
12 2 (1 ) 5 (1 ) (1 ) exp
γ
ε β μγ γ σ
⎛⎞ −
⎜⎟
⎝⎠ +. − − −  
x′ = ( )
12 2 (1 ) 5 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) exp
γ
σε βμ γ γ σ
⎛⎞ −
⎜⎟
⎝⎠ +. − − − + Δ .  
 
 
The welfare expressions (14) and (15) have some intuitive properties. First, the 
welfare effect of a change in income risk is a nonlinear and increasing function of the 
initial level of income risk. Put differently, if workers are already exposed to a large 
amount of income risk, then increasing income risk hurts a lot. Second, the welfare 
effects are increasing in the risk-aversion parameterγ : the more risk-averse the 
workers are, the stronger is the welfare effect of a change in income risk. Finally, the 
welfare effects are the same for all workers regardless of their wealth. This property is 
the result of the joint assumption of homothetic preferences and an income process 
defined as in (11).  
 
The welfare expressions (14) and (15) form the basis for our quantitative welfare 
analysis of trade reform. In order to conduct such an analysis, we need information 
about the income parametersμ ,
2
ε σ , and  σ Δ  and the preferences parameters β  and   16
γ . Our empirical analysis provides estimates of the income parameters. For the 
preference parameters, we choose an annual discount factor of  96 β =.  and allow the 
degree of risk aversion γ  to (separately) take values 1 and 2. These values for the 
preference parameters are in line with the values used in the macroeconomic literature 
(Cooley (1995)).  
 
V. Results  
 
In the first step of our analysis, we use data on individual income changes from 
workers in different manufacturing sectors in Mexico and the methodology outlined 
in section II to estimate quarterly income risk parameters in each of these sectors 
during the time period 1987-1998. Tables II and III provide the average estimate of 
2
ε σ  and 
2
η σ  for each year (averaged across industries) and for each industry (averaged 
over time) respectively. The mean value (across industries and over time) of the 
quarterly variance of the persistent shock,
2
ε σ , is estimated to be 0.0065, or 0.026 in 
annual variance. As expected, given the extent of measurement error in the income 
data (see our discussion in Section II), the estimated variances of transitory shocks are 
much larger in magnitude.  
 
Human Capital Categories  
 
We separate workers into three human capital (education) categories. In the first 
group, we have workers with zero to six years of education. The second group 
consists of those workers with more than six years of education but who haven’t 
graduated high school. Finally, the third group consists of workers who are all high 
school graduates. As indicated in Table IV, In our data set, the first group comprises 
approximately 36 percent of the workforce, the second group comprises 46 percent 
and workers in the highest human capital category the remaining seventeen percent of 
the workforce. Table II also presents estimates (averaging over industries and time) of 
the quarterly variance for the different human capital categories. An indicated there, 
on average, workers with intermediate levels of human capital face the highest level 
of income risk in our data. The quarterly variance of the persistent shocks to income 
that they face is 0.0075. In comparison, the quarterly variance is estimated to be   17
0.0045 for workers in the low human capital category and 0.006 for workers in the 
high human capital category.  
 
A similar regression analysis (not reported here) was conducted for transitory income-
shock parameters,
2
η σ , but we did not find any statistically significant relationship 
between transitory shocks to income and trade policy. One explanation of this 
negative finding is that our estimates of transitory income shocks are contaminated by 
measurement error in income.  
 
As indicated earlier, to relate trade policy to idiosyncratic income risk, the 
specification we use is:  
 
2
jtj t j tj t j t ετ δ σ αα α α τ α τ ν =+ ++ + Δ +  (10) 
 
In (10) we have included on the right hand side the following variables: τ   − the ad-
valorem sectoral tariff rate,  τ Δ  − the change in the tariff over the preceding year,  j α  
− an industry fixed- effect, and  t α   − a time dummy that captures general 
macroeconomic events in the economy. The effect of the tariff level on income risk is 
given by the coefficient  τ α  and the effect of tariff changes on income risk is given by 
the coefficient  δ α .  
 
Regression results are presented in Table V.
13 We note first that the estimate of  τ α  is 
insignificant for all the human capital categories and we are therefore unable to reject 
that the mean effect of the tariff level on income risk is zero for all three groups. 
However, trade policy changes have statistically and economically significant short 
run effect on income risk for individuals with intermediate levels of human capital 
( ˆδ α  = -0.219, with an estimated standard error of 0.102). This estimate indicates that, 
on average, lowering the tariff rate by five percent would, for a year, raise  ε σ  from a 
mean level of 0.0065 to 0.013 − a substantial increase in the risk to income faced by 
individuals. It is worth emphasizing that the effect of trade policy changes on risk to 
                                                 
13 See Krebs, Krishna and Maloney (2005) for a detailed qualitative discussion of why policy 
endogeneity and the possible self-selection of workers into sectors is only a minimal concern in this 
context.   18
income faced by very low income workers is highly insignificant. Individuals in the 
top human capital category see only marginally (statistically) significant effects.  
 
Welfare Analysis  
 
Using the theoretical results derived in section IV and the empirical estimates 
obtained from the estimation of (10), we can estimate the welfare costs of trade policy 
changes due to any changes in income risk faced by workers. For the preference 
parameters we choose an annual discount factor of  96 β =.  and a degree of risk 
aversion of  1 γ =  or  2 γ = . As mentioned before, these values for the preference 
parameters are in line with the values used in the macroeconomic literature (Cooley 
(1995)). Consider a tariff reform which involves a lowering of the tariff level by five 
percent. Given our empirical estimates, this would raise 
2
ε σ  in the short run (i.e., for 
one year following the reform) from a mean level of 0.065to 0.013. The 
corresponding welfare cost of this change is calculated to be 0.98 percent of 
permanent consumption if the co-efficient of risk aversion  1 γ =  and is calculated to 
be 1.96 percent of lifetime consumption if the  2 γ =  instead (always using an annual 
discount factor of  96 β =. ).  
 
Our findings can be summarized as follows. The level of openness of an economy is 
not found to be related to income risk for workers of any type. Furthermore, changes 
in trade policy (i.e., trade policy reforms) are not found to have any affect on the risk 
to income faced by workers with either low or high levels of human capital. However, 
workers with intermediate levels of human capital are found to experience a 
statistically and economically significant increase in income risk immediately 
following liberalization of trade. Our findings thus point to an interesting non-
monotonicity in the interaction between human capital, income risk and trade policy 
changes. Finally, the welfare costs associated with the estimated increases in income 
risk, for workers with intermediate levels of human capital are substantial.  
 
VI. Conclusions  
 
This paper studies empirically the relationship between trade policy and individual   19
income risk. The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, longitudinal data are used to 
estimate individual income risk of manufacturing workers in various human capital 
categories. Second, the variation in income risk and trade barriers − both over time 
and across sectors − is used to arrive at estimates of the relationship between trade 
policy and individual income risk for these different workers. Finally, using the 
estimates of this relationship between trade policy and income risk, a simple dynamic 
general equilibrium model with incomplete markets is used to obtain estimates of the 
welfare costs of the effects of trade policy on income risk.  
 
Our findings can be summarized as follows. The level of openness of an economy is 
not found to be related to income risk for workers of any type. Furthermore, changes 
in trade policy (i.e., trade policy reforms) are not found to have any affect on the risk 
to income faced by workers with either low or high levels of human capital. However, 
workers with intermediate levels of human capital are found to experience a 
statistically and economically significant increase in income risk immediately 
following liberalization of trade. Our findings thus point to an interesting non-
monotonicity in the interaction between human capital, income risk and trade policy 
changes. Finally, the welfare costs associated with the estimated increases in income 
risk, for workers with intermediate levels of human capital are substantial. However, 
it is worth pointing out that our welfare analysis here focuses exclusively on the link 
between trade policy and individual income risk, and other possible channels through 
which trade policy may affect the economy are not studied here. More specifically, 
we would expect trade reform to have positive effects on the efficiency of resource 
allocation and economic growth, and such effects are important factors that ought to 
be taken into account when evaluating the total costs and benefits of trade reform. 
Additionally, our welfare calculations are based on a simple theoretical model whose 
limitations include its neglect of the effect of income risk on labor supply and capital 
accumulation. Moreover, our calculations do not take into account that the welfare 
cost of an increase in income risk might be partially offset by a rise in transfer 
payments from the government or firms.
14 Finally, while our estimates of income 
shocks were obtained using observations on individuals over a limited time period, 
our welfare analysis assumes that shocks that are highly persistent through our sample 
                                                 
14Being that such transfers are provided by entities within the economy, they should perhaps   20
period are equally persistent beyond this period. Thus, the welfare results presented in 
this paper have to be interpreted with caution keeping in mind our exclusive focus on 
the link between trade policy and income risk and the methodological limitations 
noted above.  
                                                                                                                                            
nevertheless be counted as costs, even if the risk to workers is fully offset by these payments.   21
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Table I: ENEU Worker Survey - Summary    




Variables     
  
  
Mean Age     32   
    
  
Mean Years of Education     8   
    
  
Fraction High School and Above     17   
    
  
Fraction Wage Earners     65   
    
  
Fraction Self Employed     25   
    
  
   24
  
Table II: Estimates of Persistent and Transitory Income Shocks
15   
Annual Averages (1987-1998)   
 
  
Year     2
ε σ   
2
η σ    Sample Size   
  
  
87     0.011   0.096   19136   
   (0.003)   (0.002)     
  
88     0.005   0.101   35397   
   (0.003)   (0.002)     
  
89     0.004   0.103   28203   
   (0.002)   (0.001)     
  
90     0.014   0.098   35167   
   (0.002)   (0.001)     
  
91     0.001   0.103   37344   
   (0.002)   (0.001)     
  
92     0.006   0.106   54022   
   (0.001)   (0.001)     
  
93     0.007   0.112   78741   
   (0.001)   (0.001)     
  
94     0.006   0.110   121716   
   (0.001)   (0.001)     
  
95     0.014   0.118   164212   
   (0.001)   (0.001)     
  
96     0.000   0.107   172766   
   (0.001)   (0.001)     
  
97     0.006   0.104   172870   
   (0.001)   (0.001)     
  
98     0.008   0.097   158707   
   (0.001)   (0.001)     
  
 
                                                 
15Figures shown are annual averages (across industries and quarters) of the point estimates of the 
persistent shock and the transitory shock. The figures in parentheses are the averages of the 
corresponding standard errors. Sample size denotes the numbers of workers surveyed in the respective 
year.   25
   
Table III: Estimates of Persistent and Transitory Income Shocks
16   
Industry Averages (1987-1998)   
 
  
Industry     2
ε σ   
2
η σ     Industry      2
ε σ   
2
η σ    
  
  
311     0.013   0.131     352     0.020   0.111   
    (0.0004)   (0.0003)         (0.0025)   (0.0019)   
  
313     0.012   0.088     353     0.002   0.081   
    (0.0007)   (0.0005)         (0.0009)   (0.0007)   
  
321     0.005   0.097     356     0.006   0.079   
    (0.0006)   (0.0005)         (0.0016)   (0.0011)   
  
322     0.012   0.124     369     0.011   0.113   
    (0.0008)   (0.0006)         (0.0014)   (0.0011)   
  
323     0.008   0.107     371     0.003   0.110   
    (0.0022)   (0.0015)         (0.0031)   (0.0025)   
  
324     0.004   0.088     381     0.006   0.125   
    (0.0002)   (0.0001)         (0.0006)   (0.0004)   
  
331     0.004   0.120     382     -0.002   0.098   
    (0.0027)   (0.0020)         (0.0015)   (0.0011)   
  
332     0.019   0.121     383     0.008   0.056   
    (0.0017)   (0.0013)         (0.0002)   (0.0002)   
  
341     0.004   0.102     384     0.004   0.073   
    (0.0016)   (0.0012)         (0.0002)   (0.0001)   
  
342     0.011   0.134     390     0.005   0.143   
    (0.0016)   (0.0012)         (0.0062)   (0.0047)   
  
351     0.012   0.107            
    (0.0029)    (0.0023)           
  
 
                                                 
16Figures shown are averages over time of the point estimates of the persistent shock and the transitory 
shock for the respective industries. The figures in parentheses are the averages of the corresponding 
standard errors.   26
Table IV: Educational Categories − Summary Statistics    




Educational Categories     Percentage of Labor Force   2
ε σ    
  
  
0 − 6 Years of Education     36     0.0045   
  
  
6 − 12 Years of Education     46     0.0075   
  
  
12 Years of Education  and  
above  
  18     0.0060   
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Variables     Low HC     Intermediate HC     High HC  
  
   2
ε σ      2
ε σ      2
ε σ    
    vs    vs     vs   
  
τ      0.077     0.127     0.180   
    (0.097)     (0.104)     (0.181)   
  
τ Δ      -0.041     -0.119     -0.081   
    (0.125)     (0.03)     -(0.056)   
  
Time Effects     Included     Included     Included   
Industry Effects    Included     Included     Included   
N     450     450     450   
2 R      0.18     0.25     0.2   
 
                                                 
17Figures in parentheses are robust standard error estimates obtained by allowing for heteroscedasticity, 
contemporaneous correlation of errors across industries and serial correlation within industries. 